In Anisminic Ltd v The Foreign Compensation Commission and another
2 AC 147, the judgment of the House of Lords actually depended upon the fact that the unlawful administrative decision was a nullity. More recent authority' is found in Director of Public Prosecutions v Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783 ,where Lord Lowry said 'the basic principle is that an ultra vires enactment, such as a byelaw, is void ab intio and of no effect'. Many other cases to like effect could be cited. An unlawful administrative act is thus undeniably void.
Unfortunately, it is equally clear that an unlawful decision is often effective until set aside by a court or other competent authority. And, if that unlawful decision is not successfully challenged, it will turn out to be as good as the most proper decision. The position is summed up by the following well known dictum from Lord Radcliffe's speech in Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] This is a description of an act, which is voidable, i.e. effective until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Yet, as we have seen, precedent requires that unlawful administrative acts are void. Moreover, it is contrary to the doctrine of ultra vires. This is because a voidable act exists, for a time at least, in law. Thus there must exist some power under which it is made. It follows that a voidable act is intra tires -yet every unlawful administrative act must be ultra vires and void.
The doctrine of ultra vires is vital to modern administrative law. It provides the constitutional basis for most of judicial review, it justifies the classic approach to ouster clauses (the reasoning of Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 depends upon the unlawful decision in question being ultra vires and void) and it is needed to ensure the availability of collateral challenge. For unless the challenged act is void it cannot o o be raised collaterally before a court that lacks power to quash an unlawful act administrative act, e.g. a magistrates' court. And it has recently made clear (Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 WLR 639 (HL)) that the absence of collateral challenge undermines the rule of law and has consequences 'too austere and indeed too authoritarian to be compatible with the traditions of the common law' (Lord Steyn). Persons could be sent to gaol for doing an act that was not unlawful (I do not wish here to debate the merits of the ultras vires doctrine -which has been criticised bv some in the recent past). The details of the debate are set out in Judicial Renew and the Constitution (Hart, 2000, ed. C F Forsyth) .
So here is the central conundrum that set me thinking about this problem: unlawful administrative acts are theoretically void yet functionally voidable. As we have seen this conundrum lies near the heart of administrative law -both in terms of the constitutional justification for our subject and more pragmatically in the need for the survival of collateral challenge in order to buttress the rule o of law. Theory, if it is to provide a sound basis on which administrative law may rest, must resolve this conundrum, while practice with such insecure and inconsistent theoretical foundations must be suspect.
A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY IS NOT THE WAY TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM
The most common way in the past of approaching this problem has been to rely upon a 'presumption of validity'. (2) The effect of the presumption is authoritarian in that it requires the ordinary citizen (who cannot afford to challenge questionable decisions in the courts) to accept as gospel everything that comes from somebodv in apparent authority cf. Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 591 ('Blind unquestioning obedience is the law of tyrants and slaves...').
(3) The presumption undermines the ultra vires doctrine. The power that supports the validity of the unlawful administrative act (until set aside) must come from somewhere. Thus there must be implied a general warrant of power to officials to make decisions, however wrong or gross. There is no such statutory power.
(4) It is a blanket approach but there is no reason to suppose that a blanket approach is necessary or sound. A different response is needed in different circumstances.
(5) The displacement of the presumption requires the exercise of discretion (by the court) in making an appropriate order. But the rule of law should not depend upon the exercise of discretion -even by a judge. Although hedged about with jurisprudence and abstract analysis in the 'The Metaphysic of Nullity', the theory thus described is relatively simple. Unlike I believe all other academic approaches to the issue, the theory of the second actor turns the focus away from the unlawful act and on to the powers of the person who acts believing that the first act is valid. All the difficulties attendant upon seeking some interim validity within the first act are side stepped; and thus the classic principles of administrative law are reconciled with the effectiveness, in appropriate cases, of acts taken in reliance upon unlawful administrative acts. That meant that the certificate and orders were void, yet their validity was fundamental to the offence. It followed that the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and the Director of Public Prosecution's appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. Clearly, the validity of die second act -the conviction of the accused -depended upon the validity of the first act, the victim's certification as a defective. In such cases the invalidity of the first act does involve the unravelling of later acts, which rely on the first act's validity. However, the voidness of the first act does not determine whether the second act is valid. That depends upon the legal powers of the later actor.
THE THEORY OF THE SECOND ACTOR: RECONCILING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNLAWFUL ACTS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES WITH THE CLASSIC PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
If the theory of die second actor does reconcile the effectiveness of unlawful acts in certain circumstances with the classic principle of administrative law, the important practical question remains: how can one determine when the second actor has power to act validly notwithstanding the invalidity of the first act? We will return to this question, but first I will consider the developments subsequent to the publication of 'The Metaphysic of Nullity'.
DEVELOPMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE PUBLICATION OF 'THE METAPHYSIC OF NULLITY'
(1) In Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 WLR 639 (HL), the theory of the second actor as advanced in 'The Metaphysic of Nullity' approved by Lord Steyn (Lord Hoffmann concurring). It was not contradicted by any of the other law lords and there is nothing in their speeches inconsistent with it. I must be very grateful for this early recognition of the theory -it would doubtless otherwise have languished unseen tor many years.
(2) Then in R v Central London County Court, ex parte London [1999] 3 WLR 1, the theory of the second actor was discussed but neither approved nor disapproved, but the analysis of the case is consistent with the theory.
(3) In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans [2000] 3 WLR 843 (HL), the theory of the second actor was not discussed but the outcome of the case is consistent \\ith the theory (the case concerned a prisoner whose conditional release date had been calculated by the prison governor in good faith on the law, as it was then understood. But in decisions made while she was incarcerated, the Court of Appeal made clear that the law had been misunderstood. The result was that the prisoner was released 59 days after she should have been. The interesting point here is that the first actcalculating the date of release -and the second acto holding the applicant until that date -were performed by the same person -the prison governor. The prisoner-recovered damages showing that in fact the validity of the second act did require the validity of the first act).
(4) Then Fleming and Robb in [1999] Judicial Review 248 criticised the theory in terms. The theory was 'broadly welcomed' but, with respect, misunderstood. Fleming and Robb accept that 'if the legality of the second actor's actions are in issue.. .the analysis begins with an examination of the powers of the second actor', but they then go on to say that'.. .the theory [of the second actor] suggests that whenever the second actor (reasonably) relies on an unlawful administrative act, that the reliance will be protected and the second actor's actions will be justified' (at 256). But this is not the theory of the second actor.
According to the true theory, sometimes the second actor will have power to act validly notwithstanding the invalidity of the first act (as in A v Wicks) and sometimes he will not and the second act too will be invalid (as in DPP v Head). Whether the validity of the first act is required for the validity of the second depends upon the legal powers of the second actor, which have to be determined by the court facing this issue.
SOME EXAMPLES OF THE THEORY EXPRESSLY DEALT WITH IN STATUTE
Most often, of course, this issue of whether the second actor has power to act in the event of the first act being invalid is not expressly dealt with in the statute granting power to the second actor. But sometimes it is. And there are several statutes, which address the issues expresslyusually giving express power to the second actor to act even if the first act is invalid. It is interesting to note that all the examples that I have thus far found deal with ensuring that the second actor has power to act notwithstanding the invalidity of the first act.
THE WAY FORWARD
Where the powers of the second actor are not expressly delimited it is necessary to develop principles to guide the courts in deciding that issue as called for by Fleming A start has already been made by the Lord Chancellor, who in his speech in Boddington said that a restriction on the availability of collateral challenge (i.e. second act having power to act not withstanding the invalidity of the first act) would be the more readily inferred wrhere the challenge precluded was to: Two further such principles may be proposed: first, where human rights would be infringed upon were the act of a second actor to be unexpectedly invalid, then a court may readily infer that the second actor has that power to act validly in the circumstances. The same principle must work the other way round. Where an act of the second act would infringe upon human rights if it were unexpectedly valid, this may justify an inference that the second actor lacked in those circumstances the power to act. This it seems to me flows readily from section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Secondly, where it is plain from the relevant legislation that the first act is intended to be relied upon by second actors and that there would be substantial injustice and administrative inconvenience if those second acts were afterwards found to be void because of the invalidity of the first act, then the court might infer an intent that the I am conscious as I conclude that these suggestions for oo the way forward are not as concrete as I would like. But, as the decided cases provide the anvil upon which the details will be beaten out the position might clarify and more precise principles will emerge. What I am sure about though, is that it is only the theory of the second actor's change of focus that allows such principles to be developed and takes this issue of the effectiveness of void acts away from the vagaries of discretion and into the realms of law. ®
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